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The three million-strong Jewish community constituted almost ten per cent of the population 
of the Polish state that emerged from the Great War in 1918. In the turbulent years of Poland’s 
reformation many of them suffered from anti-Semitic excesses and a number of pogroms. 
However, the threat of violence and an electoral system biased in favour of big parties proved 
insufficient in uniting the fragmented Jewish political organisations. The run-up to the first 
nationwide elections in 1922 saw the formation of six different Jewish parties and a myriad of 
local political organisations, rather than a broad electoral bloc. 
This paper analyses the three explanations for this Jewish disunity that have been dominant 
in historiography: ideological conflicts, the different political realities Jews experienced in the 
Russian and Austrian partitions, and pragmatic considerations. The interaction between these 
motivations is investigated by focusing on parties representing the most powerful Jewish 
political movements in the post-war era: Zionism, Orthodoxy, and Socialism. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In his 1907 story Samooborona the writer Israel Zangwill describes a shtetl located in 
the Russian partition of Poland. The village is visited by a young man who tries to 
organise the local Jews in the face of sweeping anti-Semitic violence. He is, 
however, unable to complete his task due to the deep ideological divisions he 
encounters there. The Jews are split between integrationists, assimilationists, 
religious traditionalists, socialist Zionists, cultural Zionists, territorialists, Bundists, 
and countless other groups. The fractious and quarrelsome community brings the 
young idealist to despair.1 
The landscape of Jewish politics in the newly re-established Polish state was not 
unlike Zangwill‘s shtetl. A contemporary journalist, Alicja Belcikowska, wrote that 
‗probably no other country in the world has as many political parties and 
associations as Poland‘.2 The First Term Sejm, elected in 1922, consisted of thirty-
two parties organised into eighteen parliamentary clubs.3 However, Jewish parties 
did not conform even to this extravagant standard. A population of less than three 
million gave birth to as many as six different nationwide parties, running in the 
1922 elections, and a myriad of local political organisations.4 
                                                          
1 Israel Zangwill, ‗Samooborona‘, Read Book Online: 
<http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnLine/19191/>  [accessed 05 January 2011] 
2 Alicja Bełcikowska, ed., Stronnictwa i Związki Polityczne w Polsce (Warsaw: Dom Ksiazki Polskiej, 
1925), p. 9. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.,pp. 21-22. 
20   ZATOŃSKI — JEWISH POLITICS IN THE NEW POLAND 
 
However, while this political plurality was comprehensible for the dominant 
seventy per cent of the Second Republic‘s population comprised by ethnic Poles, it 
appears less commonsensical for the Jewish minority. The Jews constituted circa 
ten per cent of the population and suffered from violent discrimination that 
intensified in the immediate aftermath of World War I, leading to a number of 
pogroms.5 And yet, unlike the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian, Belorussian 
and German political groups who sought to overcome the prejudice of the voting 
system against smaller parties6 by running in the elections as part of the 
consolidated Bloc of National Minorities (BNM),7 the Jewish community remained 
fragmented and torn by internal strife.8 
This polarisation of Jewish electoral lists has been attributed by historians to 
several different causes. This paper discusses the three dominant explanations for 
the reluctance of some Jewish groups to join a common electoral platform. 
The first stresses the importance of the core ideological differences between the 
Jewish parties, suggesting that the respective core beliefs of Zionist, Socialist, and 
Orthodox Jews were simply irreconcilable, preventing any potential political 
collaboration.9 
The second suggests that any potential cohesiveness was hampered by the 
experiences of Jewish parties before the unification of Poland. The Jews living in 
the Russian partition were effectively barred from political life, while those in 
Austria-Hungary enjoyed years of active participation. As a result the two groups 
developed differing approaches to politics, with the latter being much more willing 
to cooperate with the government than the former.10  
The third explanation proposes that rather than ideology and history, it was the 
influence of the broader occurrences on the political scene of 1920s Poland that 
affected most of the behaviour of Jewish political parties.11 These events made 
running independently the pragmatic choice for some Jewish parties, just as they 
made running as part of an electoral bloc more beneficial for others. Those key 
events include the post-World War I anti-Semitic backlash and the Ukrainian 
election boycott in Eastern Galicia in 1922. 
These three historiographic positions are illustrated by focusing on the 
participation of four Jewish parties in the 1922 Sejm elections. The first one is the 
Bloc of National Minorities itself. Congregating groups as diverse as rich German 
                                                          
5 Joseph Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews In Poland 1919-1939 (Berlin: [n.pub.], 1983), pp. 
16-17. 
6 Seventy-two out of the Sejm‘s 444 seats could be contested only by parties that had put candidates in 
more than six of the sixty-four constituencies. 
7 Only one member of the Sejm from these three minorities was elected from outside the BNM in 1922: 
the representative of the Ukrainian pro-Polish ‗Chliborobi‘ party. 
8 Rafael F. Scharf, ‗What Shall We Tell Miriam?‘, in Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry, volume VIII: Jews in 
Independent Poland 1918-1939, ed. by Antony Polonsky et al. (London: Littman Library of Jewish 
Civilization, 1994), p. 297. 
9 Ezra Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years, 1915-1926 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981), p. 16. 
10 Ignacy Schiper et al., eds, Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej, vol. II (Warsaw: [n.pub.], 1936), p. 287. 
11 Andrzej Ajnenkiel, Parlamentaryzm II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1975), pp. 275-
276. 
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industrialists and poor Belorussian peasants in defence of minority rights, the 
Jewish wing of the Bloc was dominated by Zionists12 from the former Russian 
partition.13 The second group are the Orthodox Jews, who in 1922 chose to run in 
the elections as part of the BNM, despite their strong ideological differences with 
the General Zionists.14 The third are the Galician Zionists, who decided to stay out 
of the BNM and in 1922 entered the Sejm from their own electoral list. The fourth 
group is the left-wing Bund, which, like the Galician Zionists, ran from their own 
list, but, unlike them, failed to obtain places in the Sejm.15 
The timeframe of this paper encompasses the 1922 elections and the events 
preceding them. These were the first (and arguably last) elections in interwar 
Poland that can be described as representative.16 The 1919 elections to the 
Legislative Sejm took place during the turbulent re-emergence of Polish statehood 
and were not fully indicative of the future make-up of the Polish state. The 
elections could only take place in 44 out of the intended 70 electoral districts, 
leaving large portions of the future Polish territory unrepresented.17 Crucially, the 
areas of future south-eastern Poland, which were inhabited by large numbers of 
Jews that were to form the future electorate, were still in the hands of Ukrainians.18  
 
 
IDEOLOGY 
 
In order to understand the behaviour and coalition choices of the different Jewish 
political factions, it is crucial to understand the core ideology that motivated their 
actions. Jewish politics were underlined by a strong idealistic streak that often 
polarised the different factions to a point where no common ground could be 
found.19  
 
ZIONISM 
The Zionists first consolidated into a cohesive organisation during the 1897 World 
Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.20 It was then that they adopted the Basel 
programme, under which they committed ‗to create a National Home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine‘.21 Zionists believed the Jews to be a stateless nation, whose 
                                                          
12 This group will be referred to throughout the essay as General Zionists, or Grunbaum‘s Zionists, 
drawing from the name of the party leader. 
13 Ajnenkiel, p. 184. 
14 Ibid., p. 270. 
15 Schiper, Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej, vol. II, pp. 293, 299. 
16 After the May Coup in 1926 Poland saw a rise of authoritarian measures that culminated in 
electoral fraud and physical violence against opposition candidates in the subsequent elections. 
17 Julisz Bardach et al., eds, Dzieje Sejmu Polskiego (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), p. 155. 
18 Michał Tymowski et al., Historia Polski (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1986), p. 281. 
19 Zvi Gitelman, ‗A Century of Jewish Politics in Eastern Europe‘, in The emergence of modern Jewish 
politics: Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe, ed. by Zvi Gitelman (Pittsbugh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2003), p. 3. 
20 Ibid., p. 4. 
21 Simon Segal, The New Poland and the Jews (New York: Lee Furman, 1938), p. 182. 
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ultimate goal must be to obtain a territorial homeland, preferably in Palestine, 
which they viewed as the cradle of the Jewish people.22  
 
GENERAL ZIONISTS  
Zionism, however, was a very broad political front, and its constituents agreed on 
very little beyond the end goal of the movement and the importance of the Hebrew 
language in building national consciousness. The biggest bone of contention was 
how Jewish life was to be organised in the Diaspora before an actual Jewish state 
was established.23 Polish Zionists in the 1920s were divided into two main factions, 
each further subdivided into smaller camps. The first faction was led by Isaac 
Grunbaum, a former secretary of the Russian Zionist Federation, and one of the 
creators of the Bloc of National Minorities.24 Grunbaum‘s group, the General 
Zionists, originated in the Russian-occupied areas of the country and consisted of 
two main wings: the Mizrachi, or ―religious Zionists‖, and the secular Hitachduth 
– the Zionist Labour Party.  
These diverse groups were brought together in the BNM in 1922 to a large 
extent thanks to a common antagonistic attitude towards the Polish government. 
Grunbaum‘s faction called for ‗Jewish control of Jewish schools, with state aid, and 
a Jewish electoral curia which would elect Members of the Polish Parliament [...] in 
proportion to their numbers‘.25 These requests were unacceptable to the Polish 
majority as they would mean shedding control over important state functions and 
ultimately transforming it from a nation-state into a state of nationalities.26 Despite 
recognizing this drawback, the General Zionists relentlessly continued to push for 
their realization.27   
 
ZIONISTS OF THE AUSTRIAN PARTITION 
The second dominant Zionist faction was led by Leon Reich, formerly a lawyer in 
the Austrian Army, and one of the main organizers of the National Council of East 
Galicia, or the Galician Zionist party.28 He was playing a similar role to Grunbaum 
in the equally divisive milieu of Galician Zionist politics. However, what 
characterised his coalition, and what made it different from the groups that chose 
to run in elections from the BNM, was the fact that they chose to pursue their goals 
in strict cooperation with the Polish government.  
While agreeing with Grunbaum on the Palestinian question and the importance 
of Hebrew, the Galician Zionists refused to enter the Bloc, seeing it as 
                                                          
22 Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, p. 26. 
23 Szymon Rudnicki, Żydzi w Parlamencie II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2004), 
p. 10. 
24 Ajnenkiel, p. 191. 
25 Eugene C. Black, ‗Lucien Wolf and the Making of Poland: Paris 1919‘, in Polin: A Journal of Polish-
Jewish Studies, volume II, ed. by Antony Polonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 20. 
26 Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939: the crisis of constitutional government 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 92. 
27 D. Stachura, ‗National Identity and the Ethnic Minorities in Early Inter-War Poland‘, in Poland 
between the Wars, 1918-1939, ed. by Peter D. Stachura (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 75. 
28 Antony Polonsky, ‗Reich, Leon‘, The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe 
<http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Reich_Leon>  [accessed 10 January 2011] 
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counterproductively antagonistic and expressing the worry that it might unite the 
entire spectrum of Polish politics, including the left-wing parties, against the 
Jews.29 Reich sustained that Jews had no common interest with the other, territorial 
minorities.30 While the Germans or Ukrainians sought autonomy, Reich believed 
that the Jews should expect no more from the Polish government than the 
fulfilment of the obligations resulting from the Minorities Treaty it signed at 
Versailles in 1919, as well as the granting of the full civil rights to the Jews that 
were guaranteed under the March 1921 Constitution.31 The Galician Zionists‘ 
ideology concerning political behaviour in the Diaspora was so different from 
Grunbaum‘s faction that they chose to run in the 1922 elections from the separate 
list seventeen. 
 
ORTHODOXY 
The Agudat Yisrael was formed largely as a reaction to secular Jewish political 
initiatives, specifically to the decision of the World Zionist Congress in 1911 to 
‗embark on educational-cultural activity in the diaspora‘, something that up until 
then the Orthodox schools had a monopoly on.32 The Orthodox Jews were appalled 
by the nationalist ideology that divorced the Jews from their religion and treated 
them as a nation like any other.33 As Gitelman explains, the ‗Orthodox authorities 
also condemned Zionism on the grounds that it sought to do what God and the 
Messiah would do – return the Jews to their ancestral homeland‘.34 They also 
opposed the revival of Hebrew as a language of daily use, seeing it as a desecration 
of the language of the Torah, the use of which should be restricted to religious 
purposes.35 The Agudat was even more hostile towards Jewish anticlerical socialist 
radicals, placing an interdict on the Bund daily paper after it started being 
published on Saturdays.36 
On issues not related to religious practice, the Agudat followed the Talmudic 
principle ―dina de malkhuta dina‖, or ‗the law of the state is law‘.37 The Agudat 
believed that a direct and conciliatory approach could be more effective in 
alleviating the position of Jews.38 The Polish authorities realised this when in 1919 
they chose the Agudat to form the official representation of the Polish Jews at the 
                                                          
29 Rudnicki, Żydzi w Parlamencie II Rzeczypospolitej, p. 132. 
30 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 92. 
31 Mark Levene, ‗Britain, a British Jew, and Jewish Relations with the New Poland: the Making of the 
Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919‘, in Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry, volume VIII: Jews in Independent 
Poland 1918-1939, ed. by Antony Polonsky et al. (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 
1994), pp. 14-15. 
32 Gershon Bacon, ‗Imitation, Rejection, Cooperation‘, in The emergence of modern Jewish politics: 
Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe, ed. by Zvi Gitelman (Pittsbugh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2003), p. 85. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Gitelman, p. 7. 
35 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 93. 
36 Bełcikowska,  pp. 887-888. 
37 Joanna B. Michlic, Poland's threatening other: the image of the Jew from 1880 to the present (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, c2006),  p. 77. 
38 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 93. 
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Paris Peace Treaty instead of the more politicized pro-Soviet Bundists and the 
autonomy-seeking Zionists.39 
However, the socially-backward Orthodox activists, unacquainted with modern 
organizational methods, struggled to establish a strong political presence on their 
own.40 Despite rejecting Zionism, they quickly found themselves looking to 
Zionists for an organizational model they could imitate. Since some of the founders 
of Agudat Yisrael were former Zionists who broke with the movement, they 
shaped their new party in the likeness of the one they had left. The Agudat 
therefore developed youth movements, daily papers, organized international 
conferences, and even established training farms for immigrants to Palestine.41 
Therefore, when on the eve of the 1922 elections the Agudat leaders realized that 
they did not stand much of a chance unless they found a political partner more 
knowledgeable in political strategies, the Zionists became their natural coalition 
partners.42 The Agudat‘s structural similarity with Grunbaum‘s party helped to 
generate an alliance of convenience between the two groups despite a wide 
ideological gap between the two. As a result, in 1922 a ‗basic common commitment 
to Jewish solidarity overcame the groups‘ ideological differences‘,43 and the 
Agudat ran in elections from the shared BNM list with the provision that they 
would not support its other constituents on religious matters.44 
 
BUNDISM 
Among all the Jewish political groupings, the Bund is the one that most manifestly 
chose not to access the Bloc of National Minorities due to ideological reasons. 
Established in 1897 in Vilnius, and centred in the Russian partition, it cooperated 
closely with Russian and Polish socialist parties.45 In its programme declaration 
during the elections to the 1919 Legislative Sejm, the Bund defined itself clearly as 
a fundamentally Marxist organization primarily preoccupied with class as opposed 
to nationalist struggle, and with the final goal of uniting the world proletariat.46 
The Bund fundamentally disagreed with the Zionist parties over the Jewish 
national question. It criticized the idea of striving for a Jewish national homeland 
in Palestine as manifestations of right-wing utopianism,47 and it also disagreed 
with the Zionists‘ confrontational stance towards the Polish majority, which it 
viewed as an example of the bourgeois class inciting Jewish-Polish working-class 
conflict through nationalist agitation.48 In its own programme, it presented 
international class solidarity as an alternative to the Zionist national ideology.49 
                                                          
39 Levene, pp. 20-21. 
40 Rudnicki, Żydzi w Parlamencie II Rzeczypospolitej, p. 15. 
41 Bacon, p. 87. 
42 Ibid., p. 93. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Rudnicki, Żydzi w Parlamencie II Rzeczypospolitej, p. 130. 
45 Polonsky, ‗The New Jewish Politics‘, p. 43.  
46 Bełcikowska, p. 888. 
47 Gitelman, p. 4. 
48 Bełcikowska, p. 889. 
49 Ibid., p. 891. 
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On the issue of education the Bund opposed the Hebrew-oriented Zionists call 
for Yiddish to become the first language taught to Jewish schoolchildren.50 It also 
rejected Orthodox isolationism and insisted that a greater social cohesion could be 
reached only if Polish language was taught alongside other subjects in Jewish 
schools.51 The Bund went actively about implementing its ideas on education into 
practice by building a private network of Yiddish schools.52  
On economic issues the Bund presented a very radical trade-unionist 
programme.53 Defending the eight-hour working day, extensive welfare 
programmes, freedom of strike, and the shifting of the tax burden towards the rich 
were all key parts of its 1922 election postulates.54 They were largely unacceptable 
to the middle-class based Jewish parties in the BNM, providing no common 
ground for cooperation. 
The ideological differences between the Bund and the Jewish parties in the Bloc 
were so significant that they precluded a shared electoral platform. The Bund 
rejected both the Zionists and the Agudat Yisrael, viewing the former‘s nationalism 
and the latter‘s conservative clerical ideology as barriers to the socialist progress it 
advocated.55 The Bund‘s interests always lay in cooperating more closely with left-
wing parties, regardless of their nationality, than with the Jewish groups in the 
BNM whose ideology they considered antithetical to its core principles of a world 
free of nation states.56 
 
 
PARTITIONS 
  
The behaviour of Jewish parties in the Second Polish Republic was conditioned not 
only by ideological considerations, but also by the practical experience with politics 
which they had gained before the Polish state was re-formed. Through the 123 
year-long period of partitions the great majority of Polish Jews inhabited lands 
belonging either to the Russian Empire, or to Austria-Hungary.57 They developed 
their own distinct customs, dialects, and political organizations adapted to 
culturally distinct settings.58 After World War I, when they were faced with the 
task of creating a common electoral block, this century-long gap proved very hard 
to bridge.59  
 
RUSSIAN PARTITION 
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 892. 
51 Ibid., p. 891. 
52 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 95. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Bełcikowska, p. 892. 
55 Gitelman, p. 4. 
56 Ibid., p. 8. 
57 Schiper, Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej, vol. II, p. 186. 
58 Vital Zajka, ‗The Self-Perception of Lithuanian-Belarusian Jewry in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries‘, in Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry, volume XIV: Focusing on Jews in the Polish borderlands, ed. by 
Antony Polonsky et al. (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2001), p. 23. 
59 Segal, p. 20. 
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The lands of the Russian partition, covering the Congress Kingdom and the 
Kresy,60 offered its non-Russian inhabitants very limited political autonomy. Since 
the failure of the 1830 November Uprising, there were no representative 
institutions in the former Polish lands until the beginning of the 20th century.61 In 
the almost powerless Duma appearing after the 1905 Revolution, the 
representatives from the populous Congress Kingdom were gravely 
underrepresented.62 Marginalized and unable to achieve their goals, their sole 
function as legislators was to protest.63 For instance, as a manifestation of their 
demands for autonomy, the Polish members refused to enter the Duma Presidium 
when the vote to be held solely concerned Russian issues.64  The most active 
political organizations in the Russian-occupied lands were left-wing movements, 
especially in the industrial areas of the Congress Kingdom.65 They militantly 
opposed the absolutist order and continued to do so after 1905, seeing the Duma as 
a parody of democracy.66 They built their support in non-parliamentary ways, 
often boycotting elections, and thus handing over their potential seats to the 
nationalistic parties representing the petit bourgeois and upper classes.67 These, in 
turn, were very susceptible to the anti-Semitic propaganda encouraged by the 
Russian authorities, and soon groups associated with the right-wing National 
Democratic (ND) movement led by Dmowski made it a centrepiece of their 
programme.68 
Jewish politicians in the region were thus facing an extremely hostile 
environment discouraging of political engagement. The Russian-dominated 
territory had a very weak tradition of social legislation and a strong tradition of 
breaking the law.69 Jews were granted limited civil rights. The situation was at its 
worst in the Kresy, but even in the Congress Kingdom they did not have the right 
to own agricultural holdings or to be mayors of small towns.70 Many Jews 
attempting to fit into this environment, while not losing the opportunity to 
participate in political life, became members of socialist, communist and Zionist 
                                                          
60  The Congress Kingdom was the geographical area surrounding Warsaw, with large amounts 
of industry and an overwhelming Polish ethnic majority. The Kresy, or eastern borderlands, 
constituted the area east of the Congress Kingdom and were predominantly rural. Outside the major 
cities such as Vilnius, the Poles were frequently outnumbered by Lithuanians, Belarusians, or 
Ukrainians. 
61 Ajnenkiel, p. 66. 
62 In 1907, out of the Duma‘s 442 representatives, only 12 came from the Congress Kingdom. 
63 Segal, p. 18. 
64 Bardach, p. 135. 
65 Ibid., p. 139. 
66 Ajnenkiel, p. 66. 
67 Ibid., p. 67. 
68 Eugene C. Black, ‗Squaring a Minorities Triangle: Lucien Wolf, Jewish Nationalists and Polish 
Nationalists‘, in The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-1923, ed. by Paul Latawski (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1992), p. 17. 
69 Jerzy Tomaszewski, ‗Some Methodological Problems of the Study of Jewish History in Poland 
Between the Two World Wars‘, in Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies, volume I, ed. by Antony 
Polonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 164. 
70 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 42. 
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movements, all of whom were antagonistic to the regime.71 Moderate Jewish 
political parties were virtually non-existent in the Russian-occupied area.72 
In addition, after the 1882 wave of pogroms in Russia, many Jews from 
ethnically Russian areas moved to the Congress Kingdom and Kresy. They were a 
group extremely embittered by the experiences they went through in Russia and 
often politically militant.73 To complicate the situation further, those educated 
among them were Russian-speaking, were brought up in a Russian cultural 
framework, and felt no identification with the cause of Polish autonomy.74  
 
GENERAL ZIONISTS 
Within this antagonistic framework, the first Jewish political parties on Polish 
lands were officially formed. The Zionists and the Bund, both formed in 1897, 
quickly became the most influential groups. The former took up the tactics of the 
Polish representatives in the Duma and became part of the protesting opposition. 
Despite their obvious differences, as Davies points out, ‗the aims and demands of 
the Zionist movement for an exclusive national homeland, not to mention their 
strident tone, closely matched those of the Polish National Democrats‘.75 Also, like 
the National Democrats, their influence on Russian politics was minuscule. In total, 
there were twelve Jewish deputies in the First Duma, a number that fell to three in 
the Second Duma, two in the Third, and again three in the last Duma, elected in 
1912.76 With numbers too low to push through any of their agenda in the 
parliament, they resorted to direct action and conspiracy, often in cooperation with 
other national minorities.77 
After World War I, these Jewish nationalist groups picked up the thread where 
they left it before the war broke out. The electoral alliance formed with the 
Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities, which grew into the BNM, had very little 
common ideological ground, and in fact the interests of the groups were often 
contrasting.78 However, the specificity of the Polish electoral system, designed in 
order to favour the large Polish parties over the minority groups, made them 
natural allies.79 The memory of opposing the Tsarist authorities helped forge this 
alliance against a new enemy: the Polish-dominated parliamentary establishment 
of the Second Republic. 
The antagonism of the Zionists towards most Polish political parties precluded 
any framework of cooperation outside the BNM, and fuelled the right-wing parties 
related to the National Democrats, who themselves continued to practice the very 
                                                          
71 Norman Davies, God’s Playground: a history of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 252. 
72 Czesław Brzoza, ed., Zydowska mozaika polityczna w Polsce 1917-1927 : wybor dokumentow (Kraków: 
Księgarnia Akademicka, 2003), p. 97. 
73 Davies, God’s Playground, p. 251. 
74 Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, ‗Some Thoughts on Polish-Jewish Relations‘, in Polin: A Journal of Polish-
Jewish Studies, volume I, ed. by Antony Polonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 280. 
75 Davies, God’s Playground, p. 255. 
76 Dov Levin, The Litvaks: a short history of the Jews in Lithuania (Jerusalem: Keterpress Enterprises, 
2000), p. 76. 
77 Segal, p. 38. 
78 Schiper, Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej, vol. II, pp. 295-296. 
79 Rudnicki, Żydzi w Parlamencie II Rzeczypospolitej, p. 128-129. 
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attitudes they displayed in the Russian partition.80 The common mentality and 
philosophy of resentment shared by Jewish and Polish nationalists that stemmed 
from their involvement in the futile Duma, led the historian Neal Ascherson to the 
bitter conclusion that perhaps ‗the lasting legacy of pre-war Jewish politics in 
Europe is not democracy, but the blind ―national egoism‖ which some Zionists in 
Poland learned from the Nationalism preached by Roman Dmowski‘.81  
 
BUND 
The second group originating from the Russian partition, the Bund, followed the 
path of other socialist movements and formed a non-parliamentary opposition. 
After its formation in Vilnius, it entered into an alliance with the Russian Social 
Democratic Workers‘ (RSDW) organization, which was a multi-ethnic umbrella 
party assembling many left-wing groups.82 However, the alliance soon broke up, as 
the RSDW refused to agree with the Bund‘s view on the Jewish minority as 
culturally distinct, and advocated full assimilation.83 The Bund was forced to 
become a stand-alone group, looked at suspiciously by other socialists.  
The Bund refused any cooperation with the undemocratic Tsarist regime. It 
quickly became a clandestine organization and, like the Zionists, preferred the use 
of direct action.84 However, despite the fallout with RSDW, the Bund 
acknowledged that on its own it would succumb to political irrelevance, and thus 
never ceased to seek allies within the left-wing movement. The Bund‘s leaders – 
Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter – both participated in the 1917 Russian revolution.85 
The party sympathized with the communist movement until it left the Comintern 
in 1921.86    
The Bund erroneously believed that its vision of a multinational and federative 
socialist organization could be integrated into the post-war order.87 However, it 
proved more flexible in its approach than the Zionists in the sense that it attempted 
to adapt its methods to the post-partition reality, while maintaining the same pre-
partition goals. After Poland regained independence, the Bund continued to 
pursue its political and ideological concepts in an almost unaltered form, but 
without ostracizing the Polish socialists, and thus adjusting its behaviour to the 
                                                          
80 Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the two World Wars (New York: 
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new reality by participating in the democratic elections, and not attaching itself to 
subversive Ukrainian or Belorussian far-left organisations within the BNM.88 
 
AUSTRIAN PARTITION 
The Polish lands under Austrian partition included West and East Galicia, the 
former inhabited predominantly by Poles, and the latter by Ukrainians (with the 
exception of large cities, where Poles dominated).89 The Habsburgs chose to 
manage the ethnic minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a very different 
way to the Russian Tsars. Galicians enjoyed considerable political autonomy. From 
the 1840s they could form parties and send their representatives to the Austrian 
parliament, the Reichsrat.90 From the 1860s onwards, ten per cent of all inhabitants 
of the region voted every year to elect a Galician Sejm that held some power over 
local legislation and the division of taxes.91 In 1873, the Galician Sejm obtained 
extensive competences in areas such as the organization of gminas,92 local 
development, agriculture, forestry, and education.93 In 1907, the elections to the 
Reichsrat became general.94 From then on, the Galician MPs constituted the third 
largest group in the parliament, after the Austrians and Hungarians.95All of this 
helped Galician politicians to acquire the parliamentary experience their 
equivalents in the Russian partition were denied.96 
By the end of the 19th century, Galician Jews numbered above 800,000, 
constituted about eleven per cent of the region‘s population, and between fifty per 
cent and seventy-five per cent of the residents in 63 Galician towns.97 This meant 
that they often proved decisive in settling election outcomes.  Their significance 
was acknowledged by both the Austrian rulers and the local Poles, as well as the 
Ukrainians who sought political allies. The Jews were well-represented on 
municipal councils, served as mayors in some Galician towns, and held seats in the 
Reichsrat.98 They enjoyed educational opportunities and constituted a large 
proportion of the learned professions.99  
Galician Jews frequently cooperated with majority groups. Already during the 
first direct elections for seats in the Austrian parliament in 1873, as well as in the 
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1907 elections, some Jewish politicians formed electoral alliances with the 
Ukrainians.100 Others co-operated with the Poles. In the 1873 elections, the Jewish 
candidate from Cracow chose to join the Polish bloc in the conservative wing of the 
chamber, while four others joined the Liberals.101 The alliance between Poles and 
Jewish elites lasted until the outbreak of World War I, and was at its strongest 
between 1879 and 1885, when almost all Jewish representatives supported the 
Poles.102 
Jews could participate in the affairs of the state and build a civil society in their 
midst, because, as Davies eloquently explains, ‗they were free from the social and 
political pressures which dominated life in other partitions. They were free from 
the cultural imperialism of Russia and Germany; they were free from the 
atmosphere of deprivation and harassment induced by Tsardom‘.103 Even the 
Galician branch of the National Democratic movement represented a much milder 
degree of anti-Semitism than its Russian branch.104 This lower level of hostility, 
combined with the more democratic nature of the regime, encouraged Galician 
Jews to lead active political lives under Austrian rule.  
 
GALICIAN ZIONISTS 
Similar to the Russian partition, the Zionists were the dominant Jewish political 
movement in the region.105 However, unlike the Zionists from the Kresy, 
dominated by the ethnically Russian Jews, the leaders of the Galician branch of the 
movement were deeply rooted in the Polish language and culture.106 Having 
gathered experience with political liberalism for many decades, they were 
moderate in their politics. Parliamentary deliberation was preferred to direct action 
and more radical and subversive branches of the movement enjoyed little 
success.107  
The Galician Zionists cooperated with any party that could help them obtain 
electoral success, not allowing personal or ideological animosity to stand in the 
way of politics. Zionists also ran as independents, and the more left-wing oriented 
of them were members of the Polish Socialist Party.108 In 1907, a Jewish bloc within 
the Reichsrat was formed, becoming the first Jewish parliamentary structure in 
Europe.109 Although some criticized the flexible approach of the Galician Zionists 
as a weakness, their method was met with some success under Austrian rule. As 
Levene notes: ‗Polish Jewish political parties with national programmes […] made 
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major strides forward‘.110 They became politically relevant, on both the national 
and local level, and were actively engaged in the life of the entire multi-ethnic 
community. 
These extremely different experiences of Zionist groupings in the Russian and 
Austrian partitions manifested themselves after World War I. The leaders of the 
Galician Zionists, Leon Reich and Ozjasz Thon, frequently clashed with Grunbaum 
within the Jewish Club in the Sejm.111 While the latter, together with his Ukrainian 
and Belorussian allies in the BNM, favoured a policy of constant opposition 
towards the Polish authorities, the Galician leaders took a more nuanced stance, 
criticizing the government when it did not fulfil the promises made in the 
Minorities Treaty, but backing it whenever its policies helped guarantee Jewish 
rights.112 The opinion that Jews could only successfully fight for equal rights if they 
remained vocally loyal citizens of the Republic was shared by the Orthodox wing 
of the Jewish Club, as well as the Jewish Merchants‘ Association.113  
The difference in political strategy of the uncompromising Grunbaum, and the 
much more pragmatic and flexible Galicians, proved insurmountable. The former‘s 
origins in the Russian partition made him sceptical of any cooperation with the 
dominant majority, and led him to believe that the only solution would be to 
obtain a level of autonomy for the Jews that would free them from their reliance on 
any Polish government. This in turn brought him closer to the other autonomy-
seeking minorities and helped consolidate the BNM.114 The more successful 
experiences of the Galicians in political dialogue and compromise made them reject 
this maximalist stance as unconstructive. They preferred to take a direct approach 
to the dominant Polish majority, and to achieve equal rights through 
demonstrating a positive and loyal attitude towards the Polish state, seeing it as a 
lesser evil and as a protector from the Ukrainian or National Democrat nationalist 
movements.115 
 
OTHER JEWISH MOVEMENTS 
Another interesting feature of the Austrian partition, that distinguished it from the 
Congress Kingdom and Kresy, were the specificities of the local Orthodox and 
Socialist movements. The Orthodox Jews, who were non-existent in Russian 
political life, participated in the Austrian parliament from the very outset. The first 
Jew who was elected from Galicia was in fact a representative of the Orthodox 
Jewry – Berish Meisels, the rabbi of Cracow, elected as early as 1848.116 Although 
never a large political movement, the Galician Orthodox Jews quickly realized that, 
unlike their equivalents in Russia, they were able to obtain greater religious 
freedom in parliamentary ways. And despite their small numbers, they proved 
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surprisingly effective in doing this. When the Austrian constitution was issued in 
December 1867, it contained provisions that abolished ‗all restrictions connected 
with religious observance, granted universal equality before the law, and allowed 
freedom of religion and conscience‘.117 The Orthodox Jews were also willing to 
cooperate with Polish parties, even those who were ideologically very distant. In 
1911, during the Austrian parliamentary elections, Orthodox representatives 
signed an agreement with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) to support it in return for 
the PPS‘s rejection of the requirements that Jewish rabbis would have to pass an 
examination in Polish language and general knowledge in order to fulfil their 
duties.118 This flexibility, acquired during the partition period, later helped the 
Agudat Yisrael in running as a part of the mixed electoral block with other 
minorities in the 1922 elections. 
The Jewish Socialists in the predominantly rural Austrian partition played a 
much smaller and less militant role than the Bund in the more urbanized Russian 
partition. The Jewish Social Democratic Party of Galicia had a membership of less 
than 3000.119 The Bundists merged with the Jewish Social Democratic Party in 
1912.120 Many Jewish socialists also continued to be drawn into the ranks of the 
Polish Social Democratic Party, led by the charismatic Ignacy Daszyński. Many of 
them opposed militant Jewish Socialist movements, and preferred parliamentary to 
direct action characteristic of the Russian Bundists.121 However, with limited 
organisational capacity and little support from Polish socialists, the Bund enjoyed 
limited success and never formed  lasting relationships with other parties which 
could have helped it find coalition partners in post-World War I Poland. 
 
 
PRAGMATISM 
 
Having analyzed the core doctrines of different Jewish movements, and the 
influence of pre-war politics on shaping their stance towards the dominant ethnic 
majority, it is useful to look at how they responded to the challenges and 
opportunities posed to them by the key historical and political events that marked 
the first years of existence of the Second Polish Republic. This will allow us to 
factor in a third element, which, together with ideology and experience, 
determined their political choices: pragmatism.  
 
WORLD WAR I 
World War I was accompanied by the worst anti-Semitic massacres since the 
Khmelnitsky uprising in 1648.122 The first months of the war brought a successful 
                                                          
117 Manekin, ‘Galicia‘, YIVO. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Rick Kuhn, ‗The Jewish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and the Bund‘, in Jewish Politics in 
Eastern Europe: The Bund at 100, ed. by Jack Jacobs (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 142-143. 
120 Joseph Kissman, ‗The History of the Jewish Worker Movement Bund in Bukovina‘, in History of the 
Jews in the Bukowina, vol. I, ed. by Hugo Gold (Tel Aviv: [n.pub.], 1958), pp. 129-144. 
121 Kuhn, pp. 136-137. 
122 Blatman, pp. 57-58. 
33   ZATOŃSKI — JEWISH POLITICS IN THE NEW POLAND 
 
Russian advance into Galicia. The Tsarist administration that followed the troops 
did not waste any time imposing order on the previously liberal region. The Jews, 
enjoying many personal, political, and religious freedoms, were one of the first 
targets. The new rulers made it a point of honour to ‗equate the Galician Jews with 
the Russian Jewry‘.123 Jews were also accused of spying for Austria-Hungary. The 
Tsarist propaganda was so pervasive that even many foreign correspondents 
writing about World War I accepted it without question. Charles Phillips, a 
member of the American Red Cross Commission to Poland between 1919 and 1923, 
wrote in his memoir, ‗that there were Jewish spies employed in Poland was 
nothing new. Espionage was such an old practice among the Jews that distrust of 
them became an every-day tradition‘.124 As a result it became almost common 
practice for the Russian troops to organize a pogrom in every town, first when 
entering it, and then once again when leaving it.125 
 
POLISH-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT 
Although the Russians pulled out of the war after the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
situation of Jews did not get any easier, especially in Galicia. Russian troops were 
quickly replaced by the semi-professional army organized by the Polish 
independence movement and the Ukrainian nationalists attempting to push the 
Poles westwards.126 Among both groups anti-Semitism proved widespread, with 
the Poles demonstrating particular hostility towards the local Jews. There were two 
principal reasons. 
First of all, Jews were seen as enemies of Polish independence. Indeed, before 
World War I and during its initial stages, the most vocal section of the Jewish 
population opposed the idea of independence for Poland.127 German and Austrian 
Zionists organized a Committee for the East and attempted to persuade the Central 
powers to reorganize Central Europe in a way that would omit the creation of a 
new Polish state.128 The only Jewish organization that outwardly supported Polish 
independence was the Bund, whose young leaders often considered themselves 
culturally Polish.129 In Galicia, however, the Zionists were seen as much more 
influential than the Bund, and thus the local Jews attracted a large measure of 
resentment from the Polish troops heading eastwards.130 
Secondly, the Jews antagonized the Poles by insisting on keeping a neutral 
stance in the dispute as to whether Eastern Galicia should become part of a future 
Polish or Ukrainian state. Jews found themselves truly between a rock and a hard 
place in this situation, as they did wanted to antagonize the nationally-minded 
Ukrainians, who outnumbered the Poles in the region. However, in the words of 
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Polonsky, ‗the Poles showed little understanding for the desire of Jews in ethnically 
mixed areas to maintain a neutral posture in the national conflicts there‘.131 Many 
of them treated Jewish neutrality as an act of treason, or at least disloyalty, and saw 
anti-Jewish excesses as just retribution.132 
The 1918 pogrom in Lviv exemplified the spiral of violence into which Jews in 
the eastern lands could so easily fall. 133 When the city was first taken by the 
Ukrainians, the Jews were threatened with severe punishment for any acts of 
cooperation with Poland.134 As a result, they chose to remain neutral and accept the 
Ukrainian administration. When the Polish soldiers retook the city in November, 
they decided to punish the local population. They went out on the streets, burnt 
synagogues, destroyed Jewish property, and massacred 340 people, seventy of 
whom were Jewish. 135 
The Lviv pogrom had broader implications for the behaviour of Galician Jewish 
politicians in Polish political life after the war was over. The Galician Zionists 
became determined to convince the Poles that they were loyal citizens of the state 
in order to avoid a repeat of similar atrocities in the future. In 1922, when they 
were encouraged to join the Ukrainian nationalists in boycotting the elections in 
protest over the lack of autonomy granted by the Polish administration, the 
Galician Zionists chose to manifest their civic loyalty by declining the offer.136  
 
POLISH-SOVIET WAR 
Another wave of pogroms came during the Polish-Soviet war that broke out just 
months after the World War I armistice. Polish nationalists exploited the theme of 
Judeo-Bolshevism in order to associate the Jews with the Soviets and to present 
them as foreign agents threatening the success of the campaign against the 
Soviets.137 In the minds of many Poles, this representation of Jews as harmful to the 
war effort legitimized the necessity of fighting back against them.138 The Versailles 
Minorities Treaty served as a symbol of Jewish international influence, curbing 
Polish autonomy, and, in an ironic twist of fate, led to even greater anti-Semitic 
violence.139  
In the same way that Lviv served as the symbol of anti-Jewish excesses during 
World War I and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, the April 1919 massacre of Pinsk, 
where a local Polish garrison executed thirty-five Jews accused of supporting the 
Communists, including women and children, became the symbol of pogroms 
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during the Polish-Soviet conflict.140 However, the new wave of violence, centred 
mainly around the Kresy, brought very different reactions from the local Jews than 
the prior events in Galicia. Rather than making them actively seek out ways of 
proving their loyalty, as the Galician Jews did, the pogroms of 1919 and 1920 
served to further harden the anti-regime stance of the Grunbaum Zionists and the 
Bund, relegating those Jewish groups with assimilationist ideas to political 
insignificance.141 They effectively pushed the Grunbaum faction into the arms of 
the other disgruntled minorities, and precluded any cooperation of the Jewish 
socialists with Polish parties in the future elections. 
 
RUN UP TO ELECTIONS 
The territorial consolidation of Poland was completed with the signing of the 
Treaty of Riga and the Polish Constitution, both in March 1921.142 The new Poland 
was far from being the state ‗inhabited by indisputably Polish populations‘143 that 
Wilson envisaged in his fourteen points. According to the September 1921 census, 
Poles constituted only about 70 per cent of the twenty-seven million population, 
with fourteen per cent Ukrainians (circa four million), over ten per cent Jews 
(almost three million), and four per cent Germans and Belorussians.144 The 
progressive March Constitution guaranteed to the minorities a ‗full protection of 
life, freedom, possession of every citizen disregarding their provenience, 
nationality, language, race, or religion‘.145 However, as time would show, many of 
these promises were to remain unfulfilled.  
Nonetheless, the Constitution turned Poland into a parliamentary republic with 
its first full elections scheduled for November 1922.146 The provisional elections 
held three years earlier indicated the growing strength of right-wing nationalists 
associated with Dmowski, who obtained over thirty per cent of the vote, becoming 
the most powerful political group in the country.147 With most of the eastern 
provinces containing high numbers of Jews not yet included in the voting process, 
only ten Jewish MPs entered the Sejm, a mixture of Zionists and Orthodox 
politicians.148  
In the three years preceding November 1922, Polish politics were dominated by 
the struggle between Dmowski‘s faction and the moderates and socialists backing 
Pilsudski. Pilsudski opposed Dmowski‘s ethnic nationalism, and dreamt of 
establishing a federal empire sprawling from Poznan to Kiev, continuing the 
                                                          
140 Blatman, p. 58. 
141 Michael C. Steinlauf, ‗The Polish-Jewish Daily Press‘, in Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies, 
volume II, ed. by Antony Polonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 221. 
142 Tymowski, p. 281. 
143 Paul Latawski, ed., The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-1923 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992), p. 
199. 
144 Stachura, p. 62. 
145 Szymon Rudnicki, ed., Druga Rzeczypospolita: wybór tekstów źródłowych (Warszawa, 1990), p. 91. 
146 Ajnenkiel, p. 153. 
147 Tymowski, p. 284. 
148 Ajnenkiel, p. 132. 
36   ZATOŃSKI — JEWISH POLITICS IN THE NEW POLAND 
 
tradition of the multinational Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.149 Treated as an 
anachronistic romantic by some, he nonetheless became one of Poland‘s foremost 
political figures after becoming the leader of the independence movement during 
World War I.150  
Dmowski, an ―integral nationalist‖, wanted the Polish state to only consist of 
territories essential for Polish security, whose populations could be easily 
polonized.151 An astute politician, he quickly realized that he could build political 
capital on his anti-Semitism, and during the Paris Peace Conference, he insisted 
that citizenship be given only to those who could prove they had had no Jewish 
ancestors for three generations.152 He justified his views with reference to the 
perceived alienness of Jewish culture and faith and fostered the anti-Semitic 
resentment among Polish peasants and workers by highlighting Jewish successes 
in trade and industry and by playing the card of Judeo-Bolshevism.153 As his 
success in the 1919 elections demonstrated, the Poles, with the Polish-Soviet war 
still fresh in their mind, were extremely susceptible to such propaganda. By 1922, it 
seemed that Dmowski‘s camp had the upper hand over Piłsudski‘s supporters. 
 
BLOC OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (GENERAL ZIONISTS AND AGUDAT YISRAEL) 
The rise of the anti-Semitic right on the eve of the First Term Sejm elections 
understandably alarmed the Jewish parties. They responded to the threat in a 
variety of ways. General Zionists sought to create a broad electoral bloc 
encompassing all of Poland‘s minorities. This way Grunbaum wanted to offset the 
disadvantage of the electoral system towards small parties by attracting almost one 
third of all potential voters.154 However, not all Jewish parties wanted to be 
associated with the controversial Grunbaum and his militant opposition to the new 
state.155 In the end, the only other significant Jewish force that joined the BNM was 
the Orthodox Agudat Yisrael, which saw in the bloc a marriage of convenience 
with a political partner more knowledgeable about political strategies.156 As a 
result the BNM obtained sixteen per cent of the vote and sixty-six seats in the new 
Sejm, seventeen of which were obtained by Jewish candidates (six of these seats 
went to the Agudat).157 Although the achievement was not as great as it would 
have been in case of greater consolidation of the minorities, it did not go unnoticed 
and the nationalists promptly used it for their scaremongering tactics, highlighting 
the success of the bloc in voivodships such as Volhynia, where it got as much as 
eighty per cent of the entire vote.158 
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GALICIAN ZIONISTS 
The Galician Zionists were one of the Jewish parties that chose not to join the BNM. 
Apart from rejecting the militant approach of the bloc towards the Polish 
administration, they had strong reasons to believe that they did not need the help 
of an electoral bloc in order to achieve a good result. This was because the 
nationalist Ukrainian parties, controlling by far the majority of the minority vote in 
East Galicia, chose to boycott the elections as a sign of defiance against what they 
saw as an illegal Polish occupation.159 The Galician Zionists, who refused to join 
the boycott, found themselves, as a result, in an unexpectedly comfortable position. 
With only sixty-eight per cent of those eligible taking part in the elections (with the 
figure as low as forty per cent in the most heavily Ukrainian areas), the proportion 
of the vote achieved by the Zionists greatly exceeded their real demographic 
strength. Despite achieving only a little less than 200,000 votes, the East Galician 
Zionists obtained fifteen seats in the Sejm (with their sister party from West Galicia 
adding another two).160 This pragmatic decision allowed the Galician Zionists to 
become the largest faction within the Jewish Club in the Sejm. 
 
BUND 
The Jewish left did poorly in the 1922 vote. Unable to find common ideological 
ground with other Jewish parties, and drawing criticism from Polish socialists for 
its militancy and unwillingness to support the PPS hero Pilsudski, the Bund stood 
alone in the elections.161 With the defeat of the Bolsheviks in the Polish-Soviet war 
in 1920 still fresh in people‘s minds, the views of a party that until recently 
identified itself with the communists held little sway. However, the Bund refused 
to compromise following the pragmatic example set by the Zionists and Orthodox 
parties, and instead chose not to enter any electoral bloc.162 With little prospect of 
obtaining a good result in the elections, it concentrated on building a strong base 
among the Jewish workers around its social and educational organizations.163 As a 
result, it achieved an electoral result of only circa 80,000 votes, which prevented it 
from gaining any seats in the Sejm.164 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The dispersion of the Jewish parties in 1922 meant that the resulting Jewish Club in 
the new Sejm was a fractious affair. It was divided into three wings – the General 
Zionist, the Galician Zionist, and the Orthodox – each with different agenda 
priorities and different views on government policies.165 As a result, the Jews were 
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highly unsuccessful in pushing through their agenda on workplace discrimination 
of the Jews, educational autonomy, and anti-Semitic violence. In certain instances 
the different factions of the Club even opposed each other in parliamentary 
votes.166 The three elements identified by historians – ideology, experiences from 
partition-era politics, and political pragmatism – continued to prevent Jewish 
solidarity within the Sejm, just as they had prevented the Jews from forming a 
strong electoral bloc that could help maximize their gains in the elections. 
However, what becomes apparent when we look at the three proposed 
explanations is that none of them can on its own explain the patterns of Jewish 
politics. It is true, for instance, that the differences between the General and 
Galician Zionists in their approach towards the government did stem from their 
experiences in pre-World War I Russian and Austrian politics. However, both 
parties were still ideologically very close and the Galicians might well have joined 
the BNM in 1922 if the Ukrainian electoral boycott in East Galicia had not taken 
place. It was pragmatism and opportunism that outweighed ideological affinity 
and pushed the Galicians into creating their own list for the 1922 election. It is clear 
that in this case the legacy of the partitions and pragmatism both played crucial 
and complementary roles in explaining the final decisions made by the Galician 
Zionists. 
The factors affecting the Orthodox Jewish movement were similarly complex. 
Entering the world of Polish politics with very little experience, due to the virtual 
non-existence of a political wing of the Agudat Yisrael during the partition period, 
the movement needed to look for more knowledgeable coalition partners. In 1922, 
it was forced to sacrifice its ideology and run in an electoral bloc headed by Zionist 
activists. In this case, again, experience (or rather the lack thereof) during the 
partition period, combined with political pragmatism outweighed ideology in 
conditioning the decision of the Orthodox movement to enter the BNM. 
However, neither can we wholly discount the importance of ideology. This is 
most clear in the case of the Bund, which, out of the movements analysed in this 
paper, was the one that remained most dedicated to not compromising its core 
ideas. Unwilling to cooperate with its Zionist and Orthodox ideological opponents 
in the BNM in 1922, the Bundists chose to take their own path, even if it meant 
limited electoral success.  
Interwar Poland had been a crucible for the major Jewish political and cultural 
positions developed in the early twentieth century. As  Ezra Mendelsohn writes, ‗it 
was on Polish soil that Orthodoxy and secularism, socialism, Zionism and diaspora 
nationalism, sought to impose their way of life and their ―solutions‖ on the Jewish 
population‘.167 Poland had thus been a true political battleground for the Jews, and 
a robust historiographic framework is essential in order to understand how these 
battles were fought.  
Analysis of the Zionist, Orthodox, and Bundist political movements can help 
draw conclusions on the role of the existing historiography in creating such a 
framework. First, all three existing historiographic approaches are helpful in 
                                                          
166 Polonsky, ‗Reich‘, YIVO. 
167 Mendelsohn, ‗Jewish Historiography‘, pp. 3-4. 
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understanding the reality of Jewish politics in interwar Poland. By looking at the 
actions and especially electoral choices of Jewish parties through these frameworks 
one can better comprehend their motivations and the guiding principles that 
shaped their behaviour on the political scene.  
More importantly, however, in order to get the best insight into this topic, one 
should not limit oneself to just one of these three approaches. Ideology, partition 
politics, and pragmatism describe three different facets of the same phenomenon, 
and are best used in conjunction. Each Jewish political movement in Poland 
prioritized a different one of these three guiding principles, but no party discarded 
any of them completely. It is only by understanding how important a role each of 
them played for a given Jewish political movement that we can understand more 
fully the choices it made. 
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1922 ELECTIONS 
 
 Votes in 1000s Percentage 
Right 2637 30.1 
Christian Alliance of 
National Unity (National 
Democrats, Christian 
Democrats,  Christian 
National Party) 
 
2551 
 
29.1 
National- State Union 38 0.4 
State Alliance of the Kresy 48 0.6 
Centre 1914 21.9 
Piast 1153 13.2 
Polish Centre  259 3.0 
Bourgeois Centre 29 0.3 
NPR 473 5.4 
Left 2221 25.2 
Liberation 963 11.0 
PPS 906 10.3 
Peoples‘ Councils 46 0.5 
Peasant Party- Left Wing 59 0.7 
Radical Peasant Party  115 1.3 
Communists lists 132 1.4 
National Minorities 1889 21.6 
National Minority Bloc 1398 16.0 
East Galician Zionists 175 2.0 
West Galician Zionists 81 0.9 
Jewish Populists (Folkists) 53 0.6 
Chliborobi  87 1.0 
Bund 81 0.9 
Zionist Workers‘ Party  14 0.2 
 
Table 1: Elections to the Sejm, November 1922. Source: Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 
1921-1939: the crisis of constitutional government (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 60. 
 
